Bhagavad Gītā Chapter 13, Verse 2: Krishna to Arjuna — Kṣetra-Kṣetrajña-Vibhāga-Yoga

Bhāṣyakāra purports

• Śaṅkaraadvaita

  Know the kṣetrajña (knower of the field), who seems divided by the upādhi (limiting adjuncts) of countless fields from Brahmā down to a tuft of grass, to be me, the parameśvara (supreme Lord) who does not transmigrate, stripped of every adjunct and beyond the reach of words like 'being' and 'non-being'. Since nothing remains to be known beyond the true nature of field, knower and Lord, the knowledge by which field and knower are made its objects is samyag-jñāna (right knowledge): that is the view of me, Viṣṇu. If you object that the Lord then transmigrates, no: agency and enjoyment belong to the known and are superimposed on the knower by avidyā (ignorance), and they stain him no more than the dark dome children see stains the sky.

  divergence: Śaṅkara (his 13.3) reads 'mām' as straight identity: the knower in every field is the one Lord, its plurality only adjunct-made. Most of the passage is a long pūrvapakṣa (if the Lord is one, either he transmigrates or no one does) answered by avidyā-superimposition, the post mistaken for a man, the sky's apparent dirt. The supplied text breaks off at 'evaṃ ca sati', mid-argument, so the rendering stops at the sky example.

• Rāmānujaviśiṣṭādvaita

  Know the kṣetrajña (knower) in every field, god or man, whose one form is to be a knower, as me, that is, as mad-ātmaka (having me as its self), and by the word 'also', know the field too as me: as the body is spoken of as one with its knower because it is his inseparable viśeṣaṇa (mode), so field and knower are both spoken of as one with me, being my modes and my body, I their antaryāmin (inner controller). The knowledge that tells field from knower and knows both as having me for their self, that alone is to be taken up: this is my view. Those who read here a bare identity, the Lord himself become a knower through ignorance, must be asked whether Vāsudeva the teacher is free of ignorance or not; either way teaching becomes impossible, and such talk, spun out to bewilder the world, deserves no regard.

  divergence: Rāmānuja (his 13.2) turns the 'mām' of the verse into body-self grammar: the knower is the Lord's body, as the body is the knower's, so 'I am the knower' is co-ordinate predication, not identity. He cites 15.16-18 (the Lord beyond kṣara and akṣara) and Bṛhadāraṇyaka 3.7 (antaryāmin) and attacks the Advaita reading directly with the dilemma of the enlightened or unenlightened teacher. The supplied text is truncated in the middle of a run of Śvetāśvatara quotations.

• Madhvadvaita

  Know me also as the kṣetrajña (knower of the field) in all fields, O Bhārata; the knowledge of field and field-knower, that I hold to be knowledge.

  divergence: ABSENT. The Madhva text supplied (his 13.3) is only the pratīka 'kṣetrajñam iti' with no gloss. The rendering above is the mūla alone. How Dvaita would handle 'mām' here (whether the Lord as a distinct supreme knower in every field) cannot be drawn from this source, and none is supplied. Jayatīrtha's Prameyadīpikā gives only the opening words (क्षेत्रज्ञमिति।).

• Vallabhaśuddhādvaita

  The jīva tangled up as kṣetrin (holder of the field) does not of itself know the field as distinct; but whoever does know it, know him as me, since being my aṃśa (part) he is of my form, and once my qualities shine forth in him he takes my name, as the sūtra says of the prājña (wise self). Such a knower has become mat-svabhāvāpanna (one who has come into my own nature). That knowledge of field and knower I praise so that you will honor it: it is knowledge assented to by my icchā (will); let it be guarded.

  divergence: Vallabha (his 13.3) neither asserts bare identity (Śaṅkara) nor body-mode grammar (Rāmānuja): the knower is called 'me' because, as my part, my qualities become manifest in him (Brahma-sūtra 2.3.29). The identification is earned by knowledge and applies only to one who knows, not to the bound kṣetrin. The final 'mataṃ mama' is read as 'approved by my will', characteristic of Puṣṭi theology.

• Śrīdharabhakti

  Having described the self that transmigrates, I now give its true form that does not: that kṣetrajña (knower), the jīva caught in saṃsāra, is in truth present in all fields and is I myself, for by its cit-aṃśa (portion of consciousness) it is my very form, as 'tat tvam asi' (that you are) indicates. The knowledge that tells field and knower apart by their difference is alone knowledge in my eyes, because it frees; any other is vṛthā-pāṇḍitya (empty scholarship), because it binds. As it is said: that is action which does not bind, that is learning which liberates; other action is toil, other learning mere craft.

  divergence: Śrīdhara (his 13.3) affirms identity like Śaṅkara, via 'tat tvam asi', but routes it through the cit-aṃśa, the portion of consciousness, and grounds the value of knowledge in its effect: it frees, other learning binds. No objection-reply, no avidyā metaphysics; the emphasis is soteriological and practical, closing with a Viṣṇu Purāṇa verse.

• Madhusūdanaadvaita-bhakti

  The one kṣetrajña in all fields, self-luminous consciousness, eternal and all-pervading, once stripped of the agency and enjoyment that avidyā (ignorance) lays on it, know as me, the Lord who does not transmigrate, the non-dual bliss of brahman. So the field is māyā-made and mithyā (unreal), while the knower is ultimately real, the ground on which that error rests; knowledge of field and knower as such is alone knowledge, because it frees and is opposed to avidyā, and all other knowing is ignorance, since it leaves avidyā untouched. The difference of jīva and Lord is avidyā-made, their non-difference ultimate; the arguments are given by the bhāṣyakāra (author of the main commentary), and I omit them for fear of length.

  divergence: Madhusūdana (his 13.3) states the Advaita conclusion more ontologically than Śaṅkara here: the field is explicitly mithyā and the knower the adhiṣṭhāna (substratum) of the illusion, and the Lord is described as non-dual brahman-bliss. He defers the argument to Śaṅkara by name of office (bhāṣyakṛt) rather than repeating it. Where Śrīdhara grounds the identity in its liberating effect, Madhusūdana grounds it in the unreality of the field and the reality of the witness.