Bhagavad Gītā Chapter 13, Verse 31: Krishna to Arjuna — Kṣetra-Kṣetrajña-Vibhāga-Yoga
Because it has no beginning and no qualities, the supreme self is imperishable, Arjuna, and though it lives in the body, it neither acts nor is stained.
Bhāṣyakāra purports
- Śaṅkaraadvaita
Because it is anādi (without beginning), having no cause and so no parts to fall apart into, and because it is nirguṇa (without qualities), with no qualities whose loss could diminish it, this paramātman (supreme Self) is avyaya (undecaying); though called 'in the body' only because it is perceived in bodies, it does not act, and not acting, it is not tainted by the fruit of action. Who, then, acts and is tainted? Not another embodied one beside the Lord, for the field-knower is the Lord; the answer is the Lord's own 'svabhāva (nature) acts': agency and taint are vyavahāra (conventional usage) belonging to avidyā (ignorance) alone, not to the one paramātman in truth, and hence those established in knowledge, the paramahaṃsa renunciants, have no adhikāra (entitlement) to ritual action.
divergence: Śaṅkara (source 13.32) takes paramātman as the one Self identical with the kṣetrajña (13.2), and forces the dilemma: if someone other than the Lord acts, identity fails; if no one does, action is unexplained. He resolves it by assigning agency to avidyā at the level of vyavahāra, and draws the practical consequence that knowers are outside the jurisdiction of karma. Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Jaina and Buddhist views are named as having abandoned this aupaniṣada view.
- Rāmānujaviśiṣṭādvaita
This paramātman is the self as it is described by its own nature once drawn out from the body: though seated in the body, it is avyaya (free of decay) because it is anādi, not something brought into being, and because it is nirguṇa, free of sattva and the other guṇa (qualities of matter), it does not act and is not tainted, that is, not bound by the natures of the body. Yet one may ask: granted it does not act, how is it untouched by the bodily natures with which it is always joined? The next verse answers.
divergence: Rāmānuja (source 13.31) reads paramātman here not as the Supreme Lord but as the individual self, 'supreme' relative to the body once abstracted from it. Anādi = anārabhya (not produced), nirguṇa = free of the three prakṛti-guṇa specifically, not quality-less as such; na lipyate = na badhyate (not bound) by body-natures.
- Madhvadvaita
He states that there is no decay or the like for Him: what has a beginning is, as a rule, perishable and made of guṇa (qualities of matter), and He has neither. 'He does not act' has been explained already: no worldly action and the like belongs to Him, just as in 'not cognizing' and similar śruti phrases.
divergence: Madhva (source 13.32) is terse and refers back to an earlier explanation. His one doctrinal move is to restrict the negation: 'na karoti' denies laukika (worldly) action of the paramātman, as the Māṇḍūkya 'na prajñam' denies ordinary cognition, not all agency. This keeps an active Lord, against an Advaita reading of total non-agency. The capitalised 'He' reflects his paramātman = Hari; the comment itself only says 'tasya' (of him).
- Vallabhaśuddhādvaita
He establishes that the puruṣa (self) has, of itself, no relation to prakṛti (matter): paramātman means the inner puruṣa, or it is so called because it has the form of akṣara (the Imperishable); being anādi and nirguṇa, this ātman, the jīva (individual soul), is avyaya. Set apart as distinct solely by Bhagavān's will, it is still a non-agent and untainted; it is taken as agent only through adhyāsa (superimposition), and not otherwise.
divergence: Vallabha (source 13.32) applies the verse to the jīva, explained via its akṣara nature, and adds what no other school says here: the jīva's separateness itself is effected by Bhagavān's icchā (will). Surprisingly he uses adhyāsa, the Advaita term, to explain apparent agency, but the separation it overlays is real and divinely willed, not avidyā-made.
- Śrīdharabhakti
One may object: in saṃsāra (transmigratory life) the Supreme Lord, through the body and its actions, would undergo the unevenness of pleasure and pain from those actions and their fruits, so how can there be equal vision? To this: only what is produced decays, and what has qualities decays when its qualities perish; this paramātman is beginningless and without qualities, therefore avyaya, that is, changeless, and so, though dwelling in the body, it does nothing at all and is not tainted by the fruits of action.
divergence: Śrīdhara (source 13.32) frames the verse as a defence of sama-darśana (equal vision, from 13.28): the worry is that the Lord in bodies would be made uneven by pleasure and pain. He reads avyaya as avikārin (unchanging) and paramātman as parameśvara, unlike Rāmānuja's individual self.
- Madhusūdanaadvaita-bhakti
Removing the doubt that the Self, though not an agent by nature, might be an agent by adjunct through its link with the body, he explains: this paramātman, directly known, the inner Self not different from Parameśvara (the Supreme Lord), is avyaya, because decay is of two kinds, of the substance by being born, or of its properties by changing, and anādi rules out the first, since what always is has no prior non-existence and so no birth, while nirguṇa, meaning without dharma (properties), rules out the second, since property and bearer are one. Free of the six changes, birth, being, growth, alteration, decline and death, it is in the body only by adhyāsa (superimposition), and as the sun reflected in water does not move when the water moves, it does not act while the body acts, and so is touched by no fruit; with sajātīya (same-kind) difference removed at 13.29, vijātīya (other-kind) difference at 13.30, and svagata (internal) difference here, it is established that the Self is the non-dual brahman.
divergence: Madhusūdana (source 13.32) gives the most technical reading: a two-way analysis of vyaya, nirguṇa reinterpreted as nirdharmaka (propertyless), the sun-in-water image, and a closing proof that this verse completes the triple negation of difference. Against Vallabha, adhyāsa here explains even the body-relation, not just agency. He identifies the Self with Parameśvara but brings in no devotional element.